The U.S. economy and financial market turmoil by James Bullard
Embargoed until 7 p.m. CDT 



































*I appreciate assistance and comments provided by my colleagues at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  Kevin Kliesen, associate economist, and Marcela M. 
Williams, special research assistant to the president, provided assistance.  I take full 
responsibility for errors.  The views expressed are mine and do not necessarily reflect 
official positions of the Federal Reserve System.
                                                 
1 Portions of this speech were delivered as: “Near-Term Challenges for the U.S. Economy,” in 
Murfreesboro, Tenn., on Sept. 26, 2008. 1 
The U.S. Economy and Financial Market Turmoil 
 
Introduction  
  U.S. financial markets are currently facing severe challenges.  Credit and money 
markets are under unusual stress.  Uncertainty regarding the true value of complex assets 
associated with mortgages has led the volume of trade in some markets to approach zero.  
Collateralized lending has also become less attractive, as lenders have grown concerned 
that they may not be able to sell the collateral should the borrower default.  The Federal 
Reserve has responded to these challenges in timely and innovative ways.  Our actions 
have included traditional monetary policy moves, but we have also implemented new and 
unconventional tools.  This innovation has intensified in response to market events over 
the past several weeks.  Today I will discuss the near-term outlook for the economy and 
the challenges my Federal Reserve colleagues and I face as we strive to implement a 
policy that is designed to deliver low and stable inflation along with maximum 
sustainable employment. 
In recent weeks, financial markets have experienced high levels of volatility that 
reflect magnified uncertainty about future U.S. economic performance.  When markets 
are this volatile, I think it is unwise to guess the level of future economic activity, 
because the economy can take sudden turns in one direction or another.  One way to cope 
with this uncertainty is to describe two possible paths for the economy.  Along the first 
possible path, financial market turmoil has a dampening effect on output and 
employment, but these effects are mild in comparison with periods of weakness 
experienced by the U.S. economy since the 1970s.  I will call this the benchmark scenario.  Along a second possible path, financial market turmoil causes severe 
dislocation, which sends the economy into a prolonged downturn that matches or exceeds 
previous recession experiences.  I will call this the downside risk scenario. 
The main challenge in the current environment is clearly to find ways to navigate 
through very substantial financial market turmoil and the associated uncertainties 
concerning real economic performance.  Many of the initiatives undertaken to mitigate 
the effects of financial market unrest on the nonfinancial sectors of the economy are 
targeted efforts aimed at specific problems in financial markets.  This is a distinct 
approach from the Fed’s much blunter interest rate policy, which determines medium-
term inflation.  Overreliance on interest rate policy in this environment does little to solve 
the problems at hand and, in addition, may cause a new and difficult-to-solve inflation 
problem in the wake of the current turbulence.   
Let me say before I continue that any views expressed here are my own and do 
not necessarily reflect the official views of other Federal Open Market Committee 
members. 
 
Current Economic Developments 
Second-quarter growth in real gross domestic product turned out to be much 
stronger than many observers predicted earlier this year.  Yet, despite this heartening 
performance, it now appears that the economy may have slowed significantly in the third 
quarter.  This slowing is associated not so much with financial market turmoil, but 
instead with the rapid run-up in energy and commodities prices during the spring and 
summer, along with increasing weakness in labor markets. 
2 One of the most significant recent developments on the real side of the economy 
has been the steady slowing in the pace of spending by U.S. households.  Economists pay 
close attention to consumer spending, since it comprises about three-quarters of 
expenditures on real GDP.  After increasing by more than 3 percent per year from 2004 
to 2006, the growth of real consumer spending began to taper off in the second quarter of 
last year.  In the first half of 2008, consumer spending has increased at an annualized 
pace of about 1 percent.  
The slowdown in consumption spending has occurred against the backdrop of the 
sharp increase in oil and other commodities prices that began last year.  In response to 
record-high gasoline prices, consumers have changed their buying patterns.  Sales of 
domestically manufactured cars and light trucks, in particular, are on pace to be their 
weakest since 1991.  In addition, record-high gasoline prices have caused consumers to 
switch from relatively high-priced, less-fuel-efficient light trucks and SUVs to relatively 
lower-priced, more-fuel-efficient passenger cars.  The end result has been a decline in 
total expenditures on motor vehicles over the past year.  Although the demand for durable 
goods such as cars and trucks is highly cyclical, it seems likely that higher gasoline prices 
can account for a large percentage of the recent declines in automotive sales.  Recent 
dramatic reversals in oil prices may mitigate this effect going forward. West Texas 
Intermediate crude oil has been trading around $80 in recent sessions, down from a peak 
of $145 last July. 
Recent developments in the labor markets will likely compound the slowing in 
real consumer spending over the second half of this year.  In September, nonfarm payroll 
employment declined by 159,000.  So far in 2008, the U.S. economy has shed 760,000 
3 jobs.  For comparison, nonfarm payroll employment declined by almost 1.8 million jobs, 
more than twice as much, during the nine months following March 2001, the last 
recession in the U.S.  It remains to be seen whether job losses will accelerate during the 
remainder of the year and become more consistent with previous episodes.  Job losses 
this year have been largest in the sectors comprising manufacturing, construction, 
transportation and utilities, as well as professional and business services.  
One of the most startling statistics to come out of the August employment report 
was the unexpected rise in the unemployment rate.  Over the past year, the 
unemployment rate has increased sharply—from 4.7 percent to 6.1 percent—mostly 
during the summer.  The rise in unemployment is consistent with a cyclical slowing in 
GDP growth, as firms respond to weaker sales by scaling back their workforce.  Initial 
claims for unemployment insurance have risen to levels not seen since the 2001 
recession. 
Beginning late last year, business capital spending on equipment and software 
weakened.  In the second quarter of 2008, for example, real equipment and software 
expenditures declined at the fastest rate in five and a half years.  For the most part, the 
bulk of this weakness was concentrated in the outlays for industrial and transportation 
equipment; business spending on information processing equipment and software has 
remained brisk.  Thus, part of this slowdown is undoubtedly energy related. 
One source of strength in the most recent GDP report was the robust export 
sector, which has been a key part of the economy’s resilience in the face of declining 
employment.  Net exports added close to three percentage points to GDP growth in the 
4 second quarter.  Many forecasters expect this contribution to decline in the third quarter, 
in part due to less robust growth globally among major trading partners. 
To be sure, the timing and extent of a strengthening in the economy will also 
largely depend on the recovery of the housing sector.  Since the first quarter of 2006, the 
residential investment component of real GDP has subtracted, on average, almost a full 
percentage point from each quarter’s real GDP growth.  This has been a very significant 
drag, and; so, any stabilization in the housing sector should provide a sizable stimulus to 
overall growth, all else equal.  Housing starts are currently at levels not seen since the 
recession troughs of 1981-82 and 1991, and those lows were on smaller population bases.  
To the extent that history is a guide, the current housing landscape suggests we are near a 
cyclical bottom in house construction.  By the first half of 2009, homebuilders will 
probably have worked off the bulk of their excess inventories of unsold new homes, and, 
after three years, we will finally see an end to the drag from this sector. 
The inventory of existing homes on the market, however, remains near record-
high levels, and it seems likely that it will take longer to work off that inventory.  Sales of 
previously sold single-family homes appear to have stabilized during 2008.  It seems 
unlikely that existing home sales would have stabilized if buyers were still expecting 
steep price declines. 
These developments broadly suggest an economy growing at less than the average 
rate over the postwar era.  This is consistent with the baseline scenario I mentioned at the 
beginning of my remarks.  But intensified financial market turmoil has raised the risk of 
the second scenario, one involving a protracted slump for the economy.  Let me now turn 
to a discussion of recent events in financial markets 
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A Shakeout in Financial Markets 
The decline in home prices has been most severe in parts of the West and in the 
Southeast—places where home prices had earlier posted the largest increases.  
Substantial macroeconomic effects from falling house prices may eventually filter 
through financial markets.  A large number of financial institutions have had considerable 
holdings of mortgage-backed securities and related assets on their balance sheets.  Total 
mortgage debt outstanding in the U.S. is about $14.7 trillion, slightly larger than one 
year’s GDP.  The mortgage-backed and related securities had provided holders with a 
flow of income derived from the monthly mortgage payments of the underlying asset.  
The recent decline in house prices, along with a slowing economy, destabilized these 
assets by causing many homeowners to default or walk away from their homes—
especially those with nontraditional mortgages.  The value of these mortgage-backed and 
related securities has since eroded and thus reduced the net wealth of those investors and 
institutions that held them.  Because these securities are so opaque, many financial 
market participants have questioned the valuations of these securities, and trading volume 
has fallen off dramatically. 
The resulting illiquidity of mortgage-backed securities and related financial 
instruments has caused severe stress for the U.S. financial system over the past year.  
Many financial firms simply did not manage risk exposure on these securities well and, 
as a result, have struggled with losses and write-downs.  A financial sector shakeout has 
ensued, one which was entirely appropriate considering the magnitude of the 
mismanagement involved.  As is normal during an industry shakeout, weaker firms are 
6 forced into bankruptcy or merge with stronger partners, and opportunity abounds for 
those firms that are able to survive and build market share in the post-shakeout industry 
structure. 
The Federal Reserve has responded aggressively in an attempt to mitigate the 
effects of the shakeout on the rest of the economy.  The key concern has been that if 
important financial market players are failing, the failure should occur in an orderly way 
with the lowest level of market disruption.  In the banking sector, there are well-
established procedures for resolving a failed institution in an orderly way.  It is very 
important to recognize that in the non-bank financial sector there are no such procedures.  
This has kept the Fed improvising, especially during the past seven months. 
The Bear Stearns episode provided the first case of a large-scale failure.  The 
novelty of a large investment-bank failure suggested that a Bear Stearns bankruptcy was 
largely unexpected within financial markets and therefore likely to cause significant 
market disruption.  In that case, the Fed helped arrange a merger with JPMorgan Chase as 
the stock price of Bear Stearns was declining toward zero. 
During the summer, mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac experienced 
increasing stress in the face of mounting losses and a rapidly declining equity price, 
which eventually led to an aggressive policy change. Placing these entities into 
conservatorship was largely a Treasury action in conjunction with the primary regulator, 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), with only a consultative role for the 
Federal Reserve.  The GSEs were previously implicitly backed by the U.S. government, 
and the recent action makes that backing completely explicit.  The GSE conservatorship 
7 removes a key uncertainty from the scene and should help to stabilize markets going 
forward. 
In September, the investment bank Lehman Brothers appeared to be in a position 
similar to Bear Stearns.  The Lehman Brothers situation had been evolving for a year, and 
at this point, market players had already seen the demise of an investment bank.  In this 
case, counterparties had plenty of time to assess the potential for Lehman to fail.  As a 
consequence, financial market participants were much less likely to have been surprised, 
and significant market disruption was judged less probable.  In addition, the Fed had 
implemented additional liquidity facilities in the wake of Bear Stearns in an attempt to 
mitigate adverse consequences from future failures.  Lehman filed for bankruptcy.  Since 
then, important pieces of the company have been sold to Barclays Capital.   
One difficulty in dealing with a crisis is the element of surprise.  Just as the events 
surrounding Lehman were coming to a head, solvency problems at insurer American 
International Group, with $1.1 trillion in assets, became acute.  In the U.S., insurers are 
regulated on a state-by-state basis with no federal-level regulator.  While AIG’s stock 
price had been declining for some time, its demise was rapid and unanticipated.  A 
bankruptcy filing in the immediate aftermath of Lehman was judged likely to cause 
significant market disruption.  The AIG board of directors agreed to a Fed bridge loan 
secured by the assets of the firm.  The terms included the ouster of the CEO and an 
interest rate set at Libor plus 850 basis points. 
It is important to stress that the Federal Reserve’s intent in each of these cases has 
not been to save these firms but to orchestrate an orderly transition for financial markets 
as these firms exit the scene in their current form.  Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG are all 
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proceeds.  In a related development, investment bank Merrill Lynch agreed to sell itself 
to Bank of America.  The two remaining large U.S. investment banks, Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley, have changed their charters to become bank holding companies. 
These events have left the U.S. with no large investment banks. 
Again, because of the lack of a regime for the orderly resolution of failed 
institutions in the non-bank financial sector, the Fed was forced to improvise in the Bear 
Stearns, Lehman and AIG episodes.  These improvised actions have had mixed success.  
In the Bear Stearns episode, there was significant, but manageable, turmoil in the 
aftermath of the merger announcement.  In the Lehman-AIG episode, there was 
significant turmoil, which has spread globally to seemingly unrelated markets.  Part of 
this was attributable to the largely unexpected nature of the AIG bankruptcy threat within 
48 hours of Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.  Last week, world equity markets declined 
precipitously in response to the problems in U.S. financial markets. 
The continuing turmoil prompted Treasury Secretary Paulson to approach 
Congress concerning a more systematic method of handling the shakeout in the financial 
sector.  As has been widely discussed, the Congress recently passed, and the president 
signed, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.  The original intent of the legislation 
was to create a market for the illiquid asset-backed securities and related instruments that 
are at the heart of the present situation.  Currently, these assets have very low prices, the 
so-called fire sale price, because there are many firms that would like to sell their 
holdings and there are few buyers in the current climate. But these securities also have a 
hold-to-maturity price that reflects the likely value of the stream of revenue for a patient 
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the government would play the role of the patient investor, buying the securities at 
auction and holding them or selling them at a future moment when financial market stress 
has receded.  In principle, this idea could be executed at no ultimate cost to the taxpayer, 
although taxpayer money would be put at risk.  An important part of the concept is that 
taxpayer money would be used to purchase assets, which would then be sold in the 
future, recouping most or all of the initial outlay.  While there are many challenges ahead 
for this program, if successfully implemented it will probably go a long way toward 
liquefying illiquid asset-backed securities markets and so would help make progress 
toward an orderly financial market consolidation.  This in turn would reduce or eliminate 
the downside risk to economic performance. 
A drawback of the auction approach to buying troubled assets is that it will take 
some time to design effective auctions in order to get accurate pricing in the marketplace.  
As the legislation was being passed and signed by the president, banks and other financial 
institutions in Europe began to experience acute problems similar to their U.S. 
counterparts.  The subsequent global sell-off in equity markets suggested that 
governments would need to take action with more immediate impact to restore 
confidence in the markets.   
One place to look for a model for handling financial crises of this magnitude is 
the Nordic countries during the early 1990s.  For a recent summary, see the speech by my 
friend and colleague Seppo Honkapohja, a governor at the Bank of Finland
2.  These 
countries were hit by severe financial turmoil and sharp recessions, in part associated 
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to take equity positions in banks and to manage the resulting consolidation in the 
industry.  As Honkapohja documents, the ultimate expense to the taxpayers in these 
countries was much less than the initial outlay of government funds.  Most observers 
regard the government intervention in these cases as a success.   
It is far from clear how financial market turmoil of this magnitude will ultimately 
affect the real economy.  Unchecked, the turmoil could have severe negative 
consequences.  However, the idea is not to leave the turmoil unchecked.  The recent 
legislation along with many other initiatives of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, in 
conjunction with governments around the world, are intended to return financial markets 
to more normal functioning over time.  To the extent that this effort succeeds, the 
ultimate effect of the turmoil could be muted.  In addition, much of the uncertainty 
surrounding the most vulnerable players in this saga has already been resolved—in 
particular, no large investment banks remain on the scene and the GSEs have been placed 
into conservatorship.  Turmoil is still significant, to be sure, but some of the largest 
uncertainties have been addressed. 
One way to look at the possible effects of financial market turmoil is to consider 
recent experience in the U.S. and abroad.  By recent experience I mean the last 25 years, 
during which the economic experience around the world has been more comparable to 
the current U.S. situation.  Analogies to the Great Depression are badly strained as the 
U.S. economy was very different at that time.  For instance, there were no bank failures 
in the U.S. until 1931, after real output had already fallen 30 percent.  In contrast, in the 
current situation real output has yet to fall while the banking and financial sectors are 
11 already under considerable stress.  So, the order of events is dramatically reversed.  In 
addition, during the onset of the Great Depression, most major economies were on the 
gold standard, which limited the policy response.  Friedman and Schwartz argued that the 
Federal Reserve allowed the money supply to decline from 1929 to 1933, significantly 
exacerbating what otherwise would have been a mild recession. This cannot be said for 
the current setting, as the current Federal Reserve could hardly be viewed as inactive 
during the past 15 months.  Also, during the early 1930s, the U.S. Congress passed the 
protectionist Smoot-Hawley legislation, which caused significant deterioration of global 
trade.  For all these reasons, and probably many more, the 1930s is not the right 
comparison point for the current situation.     
Instead, the leading modern example for large economies is Japan. The Japanese 
economy is technologically and financially very sophisticated, not unlike the U.S.  The 
Japanese stock and real estate markets peaked around 1990, and the subsequent decline 
caused severe problems for Japanese banks.  The policy response to the banking crisis 
has generally been judged ineffective, and the real economy in Japan was plagued by a 
decade or more of sub par performance.  This seems to be the primary risk for the U.S. 
going forward.   
Other modern examples include the countries most closely involved in the Asian 
currency crisis of 1997 and 1998.  Many countries suffered through severe recessions 
during that episode.  So, between the Japanese experience since 1990, the Nordic 
countries’ financial crises of the early 90s and the Asian currency crisis, there is 
considerable recent precedent for very negative macroeconomic performance associated 
12 with financial market turmoil.  Certainly, this is not an exhaustive list, but other examples 
often involve countries with more specialized problems.   
In the modern U.S. experience, we have been more fortunate so far.  The 1987 
stock market crash— when the Dow fell 22 percent on a single day—has often been 
mentioned in conjunction with recent events.  However, real GDP growth was actually 
strong during the second half of 1987:  Third quarter growth was 3.7 percent, and fourth 
quarter growth was 7.2 percent.  At the time, many suggested that the U.S. was in or 
would immediately go into recession due to financial market disruption.  It did not 
happen, which provides an object lesson about how difficult it can be to really understand 
what is driving short-term dynamics in the economy.  Similarly, the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management occurred in the second half of 1998, the culmination of a year 
of turmoil in global financial markets.  But U.S. real GDP growth in the second half of 
1998 averaged about 5.5 percent.  To be sure, there were important policy responses in 
both 1987 and 1998.  Still, combined with an adequate policy response, these were 
episodes of turmoil that did not have a clear impact on real economic performance. 
All of these events offer clues but also differ in important ways from the current 
episode.  We do not know what will happen this time around, and we should be humble 
in our predictions.  Part of the answer depends on how successful the current policy 
initiatives will be.  Still, these examples suggest that there is substantial downside risk.  
There is some possibility that the turmoil will be mitigated in part on its own and in part 
because of successful policy, ultimately leading to a relatively benign outcome, where the 
financial market shakeout unfolds and real economic performance is muted but not 
disastrous.  But there is also some possibility of a very adverse outcome, perhaps similar 
13 to Japan’s, in which policy initiatives do not work well, the turmoil is exacerbated and 
the entire economy is drawn into a protracted downturn.   
 
Conclusions 
  In summary, the U.S. economy by the numbers looks like it is slowing.  Many of 
the most recent events have injected tremendous uncertainty into the national outlook, but 
we have few hard numbers at this point that directly indicate the effect of that 
uncertainty.  If financial market turmoil can be contained, possibly through aggressive 
government policy, then a relatively benign outcome is possible in which U.S. economic 
performance is sluggish but does not involve a protracted downturn.   
During the last 15 months, the Fed has been forced to improvise in response to 
evolving financial market conditions.  This is in part because there is no clear method for 
handling large failing firms in the non-bank financial sector.  By contrast, the 
methodology for closing failed banks and thrifts is well established and indeed served the 
nation well during the S&L crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The improvised 
actions have had mixed success, with manageable volatility following Bear Stearns but 
substantially higher volatility later, especially on the heels of the near-bankruptcy of 
insurer AIG.  The recent Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was intended in part to 
provide the tools to enable a more systematic response to financial market turmoil.  One 
way to use these tools is to follow the example of the Nordic countries’ response to 
financial market turmoil during the early 1990s.  In considering the nature of the 
downside risks we face, the most reasonable comparison point may be the experience in 
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Japan since 1990.  A well-executed government intervention can avoid the problems that 
Japan faced and help to stabilize the financial sector along with the U.S. economy. 
 
 